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Introduction 
This essay was originally submitted to a workshop on Citizen Partici-
pation in East Asian Legal Systems held at Cornell Law School in late Sep-
tember 2006. 1 If the Korean and Japanese proposals discussed at the 
Conference represent the most advanced experiments in citizen participa-
tion in Asian legal systems, 2 Thailand's legal system, and its lack of citizen 
participation, may be more typical of the large majority of East and South-
east Asian legal systems, where the prospects for lay participation are 
bound up with globalization and progress toward democracy. These com-
ments were inspired by Thailand's 1997 "People's Constitution."3 This 
remarkable constitution emphasized democracy, the rule of law, and citi-
1. I am grateful to Professor Valerie Hans for the opportunity to present this mate-
rial and to learn from the distinguished scholars who attended the Conference which 
she organized. I would like to thank Robert Albritton, David Engel, Kevin Hewison, 
Fiona Haines, and Simon Singer for helpful conversations about material in the paper. I 
offer particular thanks to my two research assistants at Cornell University, Nuanchan 
Singkran and Poonrit Kuakul, for translations of Thai newspaper reports and for gui-
dance in reading them, and to my New York Law School research assistant Cory Blitz for 
assistance with internet research. This material is based in part upon work supported 
by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0454690. Any opinions, findings, 
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
2. Sherry Martin, Legal Consciousness and Political Socialization, paper delivered at 
the Cornell Law School Conference on Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems, 
September 22-23, 2006; judge Rakwon Jang, The Law Reform Process in Korea, paper 
delivered at the Cornell Law School Conference on Citizen Participation in East Asian 
Legal Systems, September 22-23, 2006; Masahiro Fujita, Planning for Lay Participation in 
japan: Ideas f ram Research, paper delivered at the Cornell Law School Conference on 
Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems, September 22-23, 2006. 
3. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, B.E. 2540 (1997). 
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zen participation at many levels and in many forms. The new constitution 
was widely believed to mark an end to popular tolerance for extra-constitu-
tional military rule. 4 The constitution, and the myth of its permanence, 
lasted nearly ten years. 
On September 19, 2006, the Thai military seized power and repealed 
the constitution, taking particular care to note that the new constitutional 
court has been "terminated," although all other courts remained open.5 
The coup is the eighteenth by the military since Thailand became a consti-
tutional democracy in 1932, and it has dismayed those who had hopes for 
participatory representative democracy and the rule of law in Thailand. 6 
Of course, that hope always depended on more than the constitution itself. 
Hope for a government more responsive to popular will and to rights grew 
with the globalization of Thailand's economy, causing the simultaneous 
embourgeoisment and impoverishment of different groups of Thai, as well 
as a growing impatience with corrupt authoritarian military and civilian 
governments, and a shifting institutional and cultural context that sup-
ported a stronger demand for democracy. The constitution's demise in 
September 2006 did not destroy the potent forces that led to its adoption in 
1997. Indeed, coup leaders promised a quick return to constitutionalism 
and to democracy purged of corruption, even though they disbanded Par-
liament and censored the media and internet after the takeover. 7 
The coup underscores an important point about western expectations 
for the establishment of rights and participation in developing Asian socie-
ties. Western governments and international agencies closely tied to west-
ern interests often advocate for transplanting western regulatory and 
judicial institutions to remedy market failures. Such transplants, once in 
place, may £Unction in ways that are quite different from their western mod-
els. More importantly, advocates often promote transplants for particular 
political or economic interests, rather than as elements of reforms intended 
to achieve broader civic goals. This makes the 1997 Constitution all the 
more unique and important. Ideas about civic participation are conveyed 
and received in many different ways. As Sally Engle Merry observes in her 
study of the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the final step in conveying west-
ern ideas about law and rights-translation into the vernacular-depends 
on many factors, including preexisting cultures and institutions, transla-
tors, the apparent risks and benefits of "taking on rights," and, more panic-
4. PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAILAND: ECONOMY AND POLITICS 417-418 
(2d ed. 2002). 
5. Coup d'etat in Thailand, BANGKOK Post, Sept. 20, 2006, available at http://www. 
bangkokpost.net/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=ll3027; Bill Barnes & Amy 
Kazmin, 'Empire Strikes Back' As Thai Army Moves In, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at 8. 
6. Amy Kazmin, Investors Express Hope on Economic &nefits From Bloodless Coup, 
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at 9 (reporting that there had been 17 previous coups); 
PHONGPAICHIT & BAKER, supra note 4. 
7. Coup d'etat in Thailand, supra note 5. 
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ularly, the right to participate in the political or legal system.8 
The apparent coexistence of public approval for the military coup, 
overwhelming electoral mandate for the ousted prime minister, universal 
respect for the monarchy's moral leadership, and support for the coup 
illustrates the challenge for scholars attempting to understand the pros-
pects for citizen participation in Thailand's political and legal systems.9 
The explanation for this bewildering coexistence of institutional forms par-
tially lies in Thailand's long history of authoritarian government. Yet as 
the evolution of constitutionalism in the 1990s demonstrates, democracy 
and citizen participation have taken root. Before the coup, Thailand 
showed signs of developing at least two cultures of democracy and partici-
pation-one highly westernized and one decidedly more traditional. Both 
embrace "democracy" but interpret its essence in different ways. Rather 
than viewing one of these cultures as resistant to globalization, rights, or 
development and the other as facilitating adaptation, we ought to view the 
emerging cultures of democracy as adaptations to the unequal effects of 
globalization on different social groups in Thailand. These multiple, 
distinctive interpretations of democracy and the rule of law reflect in 
part different responses to the unequal effects of globalization and mod-
ernization that greatly complicate the future for citizen participation in 
Thailand. 
I. Globalization 
Contemporary, "third wave" globalization is as much about ideas as it 
is about the direct flow of material and financial resources. 10 "First wave" 
globalization grew from the resource needs of industrialization and the 
expansion of global transport prior to the end of the nineteenth century. 11 
"Second wave" globalization during the mid-twentieth century reflected the 
establishment of global financial institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 12 By the end of the twentieth century, 
8. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING HUMAN 
RIGHTS INTO LOCAL JusTICE 215-17 (2006). 
9. The King has always been and remains an ambiguous figure-formally almost 
powerless but, in truth, revered beyond all others, as a person and institution, and 
holder of the trump cards. PAUL HANDLEY, THE KING NEVER SMILES: A BIOGRAPHY OF THAI-
LAND'S BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (2006). In 1992, following a bloody rebellion against the 
last military coup, the King required the leaders of the military and the rebellion to 
prostrate themselves before him and demanded that a resolution be reached. Kevin 
Hewison, Introduction: Power, Oppositions, and Democratisation, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN 
THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 1, 2 (1997). The military who conducted the 
recent coup formed a Democratic Reform Council with the King as its nominal head. 
Coup d'etat in Thailand, supra note 5. 
10. Ammar Siamwalla, Globalisation and its Governance in Historical Perspective, in 
SOCIAL CHALLENGES FOR THE MEKONG REGION 13-22 (M. Kaosa-ard &J. Dore eds., 2003). 
11. THE WORLD BANK, GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH AND POVERTY: BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE 
WoRLD ECONOMY (World Bank Policy Research Report #23591) 24-25 (2002). 
12. See, e.g., Ute Piper & Lance Taylor, The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF, the 
World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized Economy, in GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE 
ECONOMIC POLICY 37, 38-39 (Dean Baker, et al. eds., 1998). 
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globalization depended on the flow of ideas and information that allowed 
multinational corporations to locate production and office facilities any-
where in the world. As a second-order effect, ideas about governance-in 
particular, concepts of participation and citizenship-are an important 
part of this flow. 
The flow, historically from the global North to the global South, is 
more complicated now. Ideas, and the institutions they are intended to 
construct, may encounter established cultures and practices that leave little 
space for rivals, or greatly alter their meaning, creating a two-way flow. 
A further dimension of this globalization of ideas is modernity. Soci-
ologist Anthony Giddens characterizes modernity by referring to two types 
of movement away from the traditional. According to Giddens, social space 
and time are no longer defined by the physical space and time in which one 
moves (disembeddedness). Society also strives to become increasingly 
aware of itself through public and private systems of information control 
(reflexivity). 13 Greater mobility and interconnectedness made possible by 
technological progress permit individuals to understand themselves as part 
of a far wider range of contexts, ideas, cultures, and individuals than a 
century or even a few decades ago. 
Access to information enhances control over our lives and influences 
how we see and understand ourselves. Public and private institutions have 
more information about us and process it through expert knowledge that 
links identity to behavior and policies. The rise of expert systems of 
knowledge is a key element of Gidden's modernity. What we have called 
globalization is in large part an intensification of both of the processes that 
Giddens describes, greatly extending boundaries of social space and time 
and subjecting more and more individuals to information control systems. 
Indeed, Giddens claims that "[m]odernity is inherently globalizing."14 
The spread of ideas about governance is part of this transformation. 
As we consider replicating the jury system and lay judging in developing 
societies we should try to understand the spread of liberal democratic 
forms of citizen participation not only in terms of the politics of globaliza-
tion, but also as an aspect of modernization, namely the potential of these 
participatory justice systems to create conflicts for individuals who are 
embedded in traditional practices of authority, knowledge, and dispute res-
olution.15 Each of these legal practices furthers modernization that 
reduces the value of local knowledge while empowering expert systems-
quite the opposite of our own folklore about citizen participation. 
Globalization of participatory governance has contradictory implica-
tions for developing societies in part because it is both modernizing-dis-
embedding individuals from their personal and familial relationships and 
reconstructing them as interchangeable citizens-and anti-modern-
13. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 21, 45 (1991). 
14. Id. at63. 
15. MERRY, supra note 8, at 139-51 (describing this process in specific conflicts 
between traditional and rights-generated forms of social participation in five different 
societies). 
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through its apparent appeal to local knowledge. But that is only part of the 
story. As a general matter, there are at least two distinct but interrelated 
transnational sets of ideas about participatory democracy that heighten 
these contradictory effects by communicating somewhat different ideas 
about participation to different audiences. Global entrepreneurship on 
behalf of citizen participation risks further entrenching the pattern of une-
ven development and growing inequality. 
Entrepreneurship urging governmental reform comes in two varieties, 
based on their intended effects. The first is "top down" in terms of 
intended effects-modernizing political systems and promoting elite-led 
development. "Structural adjustment" makes markets safer. Civic partici-
pation serves to control corruption and stabilize markets and political sys-
tems by making government responsive (but not too responsive). 16 
The second form of entrepreneurship seeks "bottom up" reforms that 
increase the well-being of individuals adversely affected by development, 
though some of these changes are engineered through international and 
governmental interventions from above. Western NGOs and activists have 
inspired a world-wide movement for rights. They are less concerned about 
institutional reforms, like juries and lay judges, than about quality of life 
and basic human rights. Their interventions are often at the grassroots 
level. 17 
The discourse about participation for the purpose of developing rights 
and capacities of individuals arises from both western and indigenous cul-
tures of participation, which sometimes have quite different implications. 
Some universal human rights have strong indigenous parallels, such as 
environmental rights. 18 Others are more controversial; for example, the 
U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women of ten conflicts with traditional practices and gender 
roles. 19 
One example of the potential conflict between "universal" and indige-
nous rights arises out of the contentious debate about "Asian values," 
which pits advocates for Asian development under paternalistic leadership 
16. "Stakeholder participation" is described as a principal goal in the most recent 
World Bank country dialog monitor on Thailand that reports on World Bank funded 
country development programs. THE WORLD BANK, THAILAND-WORLD BANK GROUP PART-
NERSHIP COUNTRY DIALOGUE MONITOR: JANUARY 2004-:}UNE 2005 (2005). The report 
praises Thailand's "emphasis on governance and decentralization" and urges further 
effort to improve the "quality of government services, right-size the government bureau-
cracy, ·increase the competency levels of public sector employees, and promote demo-
cratic governance." 
17. Amartya Sen argues that there is an important link between the realm of formal 
institutions such as democracy .(and presumably other forms of participation that 
increase responsiveness) and quality of life. In turn, enhancement of fundamental quali-
ties of life (health, education) leads to faster more equitable economic development 
because individuals are able and motivated to participate to the full extent of their capac-
ities. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 15-21 (1999). 
18. See, e.g., Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based 
Cultures: The Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 Wis. lNT'L L. J. 
553, 592-96 (2005). 
19. MERRY supra note 8, at 90-91. 
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against proponents of western individualism and individual rights. Most 
of the proponents of Asian values are Asian autocrats. The dichotomy has 
been rejected by most scholars, but many recognize that the "civil society 
organizations" of Asian cultures may socialize individuals for civic partici-
pation in very different ways. While development has undermined the wel-
fare of traditional communities, the best solution may be not to reconstruct 
civil society according to a western model. Any expectation that Asians, 
and Thai in particular, will readily join secular, western-style interest 
groups or readily engage in western forms of civic participation is 
unrealistic. 20 
II. Participation as an American Ideal 
In the United States, popular understanding of participation starts 
with de Tocqueville. 21 In 1830, de Tocqueville described the buzzing com-
merce of small town American life as the essence of civic participation. He 
perceived the central role of local courts and lawyers as an expression of 
interconnectedness and local regulation. De Tocqueville commented that 
every local political issue enters the courts.22 In 1830s America, courts, in 
some sense, were "government by the people" because there was little other 
day-to-day government. Today, "adversarial legalism" is said to arise in the 
United States in part from the lack of responsiveness of governmental 
administration.23 Courts are participatory, politically permeable, and sel-
dom final because they can be overruled by a more refined, authoritative 
political will. Thus, courts function much like the original Madisonian 
design for government. Our courts are uniquely accessible and responsive 
to problems that are considered political, rather than judicial, in most 
societies. 24 
This is a vision of participatory governance that does not appear to 
allow for disembeddedness or to defer to expert systems of information 
gathering and control. On closer examination, however, the seeds of both 
are present. James Madison believed that the national legislature creates a 
space for genuinely disinterested consideration of the public good, pre-
cisely because the individuals are disembedded, and expert in governance 
because they are likely to be an elite. But Madison's vision was not modern 
because he did not expect government at higher levels to do much. Now 
that national government is the center of action, modernization grows 
from Madison's pre-modern institutional vision. 
20. See generally Randall Peerenboom, Social Networks, Civil Society, Democracy, and 
Rule of Law: A New Conceptual Framework, in THE POLITICS OF AFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP: 
EAST AsIA AND BEYOND 249 (Hahm Chaihark &Daniel Bell eds., 2004). 
21. ALEXIS DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Bruce Frohnen ed., Henry Reeve, 
C.B. trans., 2004) (1889). 
22. See id. at 73-79. 
23. See Robert A Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (2003). 
24. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Bhophals, Past and Present: The Changing Legal Response 
to Mass Disaster, 10 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TOjUST. 151 (1990). 
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Today, developed democracies have institutionalized many different 
forms of citizen participation in governance, although they do not share all 
of them. Different forms of participation in governance have different ori-
gins, different effects, and depend on different clusters of perceptions and 
practices to support them. Instead of a general model, there are many par-
ticular forms of participation in particular locations. Although not all of 
them are successful, the idea of participation remains powerful and influ-
ential because we trust it. 2s 
A positive perspective on participatory procedure is offered by Tom 
Tyler and his many collaborators who have shown that trust in judicial and 
policy decisions increases when procedures are perceived as fair. 26 Partici-
pation as an interested party is one of those procedural ingredients, but 
third-party citizen participation, through juries or lay judges, may also 
increase legitimacy under the right conditions. 27 Jury trials, though they 
are a rare event in our legal system, remain a powerful and important sym-
bol, and an arguably important check on prosecutorial, litigant, and judi-
cial power. 
Ill. Case study: Thai Institutional Change 
Thailand has been influenced by both the top down and bottom up 
contemporary global flow of ideas about democracy and participation. 
The influence of western jurisprudence on Thai legal institutions, however, 
reaches back to the nineteenth century. Assimilation of European jurispru-
dence into Thai legal culture accelerated in the nineteenth century, incor-
porating various elements without losing its distinctive character. 
Thailand adopted the form of a modern administrative state, but power 
remained in the hands of an autocratic ruler and his royal family, who 
25. The modern development of the due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments of the U.S. Constitution is a powerful institutional legitimator of citizen 
participation in adjudications. Notably, the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) guaranteed the right to participate in adjudication of one's 
property rights to the most poor and deeply subordinated members of society-welfare 
recipients. Yet how did it change outcomes, legal consciousness (of recipients), or U.S. 
culture? Increasing number of individual adjudications soon led to complex codifica-
tions of rules which, in practice, proved to be no less arbitrary and manipulable. The 
legal consciousness of welfare recipients tilted less toward empowerment than increas-
ing recognition of need for the expertise of a legally trained advocate. While Goldberg 
recognized the growing significance of entitlements in modern society, it made entitle-
ments a symbolic political target of conservatives. A conservative Congress eventually 
pushed for elimination all federal welfare entitlements. Thus, Goldberg, and related 
cases establishing a constitutional right to participation in adjudication, contributed to 
unexpected institutional consequences: increasing cost, complexity, subordination of 
lawyers, and ultimately declining political support for entitlements. How's that for a 
bummer of a message about participation? 
26. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Yuen j. Huo, The Overall Influence of Social Motives 
on Decision Acceptance, in TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH 
THE POLICE AND COURTS 76-96 (2002), reprinted in PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: VOLUME I 143, 
157 (Tom R. Tyler ed.) (2005). 
27. This is a premise of the experimental introduction of lay judging in Korea and 
Japan. See supra note 2. 
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combined the absolute authority of the Monarchy (Mahakesat), symbolic 
representation of the Nation (Chat), and control over the central adminis-
tration of Buddhism (Satsana).28 The Thai monarchy's historical compro-
mise with western power opened Thai legal culture to the influence of 
powerful new values, including the concepts of equality and human rights. 
These new values transformed Thai politics and contributed to the creation 
of a constitutional monarchy in 1932. 29 
Frank Reynolds contrasts Thai "civic religion" with the central values 
in American culture that Robert N. Bellah termed "utilitarian individual-
ism. "30 While the American civic religion developed from a tradition of 
individual freedom of conscience and dissent, treating institutionalized 
authority with suspicion, Thai civic religion grew from a tradition far more 
respectful of the authority of traditional, moral, and spiritual leaders rather 
than the moral conscience of individuals.31 Nevertheless, Thai legal cul-
ture valorized the people's welfare in a way that enabled advocates to lever-
age it on behalf of popular movements. Equality and democracy (if not 
precisely representative democracy) appealed not only to elites, but also to 
the Thai people generally, and observers credit growing support for these 
values with the strong rejection of military rule in 1992 followed by pres-
sure for democracy and constitutional reform.32 
In 1996, coincident with the final stages of constitutional reform, the 
Thai economy collapsed. The collapse created an opportunity for "struc-
tural adjustment" -a prototypical "top down" flow of ideas about govern-
ance-through pressure from the International Monetary Fund to increase 
transparency and market stability.33 For several decades, the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, and other powerful international financial 
actors with an interest in Thailand's economic development added their 
influential support for governmental reforms to increase market stability, 
including greater participation by citizens through decentralization and 
promotion of civil society organizations.34 Thai public opinion attributed 
the crash to mismanagement and corruption, adding fuel to the constitu-
tional reform movement. 35 Parliament approved the draft constitution and 
sent it to voters just as the effects of the crash reached their height in late 
1996. 
However, the Thai people generated the primary pressure for a more 
democratic constitution and for greater democratic participation. The new 
28. See Frank E. Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The Interactions of Religion and Law 
in Thailand, 28 LAw & Soc'v REV. 433, 442 (1994). 
29. Id. at 442-43. 
30. Id. at 441. 
31. See id. at 441-43. 
32. Phongpaichit & Baker, supra note 4, at 411-414 et seq. 
33. Id. 430-436. 
34. See Chantana Banpasirichote, Civil Society and Good Governance: A New Chapter 
in Thailand's Political Reform?, in 1 DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AsIA: GLOBALIZA-
TION, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AsIA 213, 225 (Fahimul Quadir & Jayant Lele 
eds., 2004). 
35. See id. at 229. 
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Thai Constitution reflects not only the influence of western institutions on 
Thai political leaders and intellectuals, but also mass public opinion that 
favored democratic reforms. Whether the specific institutional reforms 
comport with popular understandings of democracy is an important and 
debatable question. In Part VI of this article, I describe democracy as it is 
viewed through the lens of traditional Thai culture. For instance, domestic 
and international NGO workers and activists, who have worked for 
decades with rural communities to protect their way of life, have also influ-
enced the perceptions and values of rural Thai by promoting a "bottom up" 
understanding of democracy.36 We are only beginning to understand the 
influence of both international and domestic advocacy on popular Thai 
values and legal consciousness. 
In 1997, following protracted political struggle and with overwhelm-
ing public approval, a new constitution expanded individual and group 
rights, greatly extended popular participation in government, and created 
new institutions to insure accountability under law, including a politically 
independent constitutional court. The new constitution mandated partici-
pation in many different forms, including, for example, decentralization of 
power, fiscal control, and electoral democracy.37 It also guaranteed indi-
vidual rights that characterize the constitution of a modern liberal state, 
the right to information, and the ability to participate in government deci-
sions affecting the "quality of the environment, health and sanitary condi-
tions, the quality of life or any other material interest concerning him or 
her or a local community ... as provided by law."38 Further, the constitu-
tion protected the right to "participate in the decision-making process of 
State officials in the performance of administrative functions which affect 
or may affect his or her rights and liberties, as provided by law. "39 The 
constitution extended democracy to local offices and created an anti-cor-
ruption commission to ensure effective voting and make office holding eas-
ier for those who are not super-rich by attempting to reduce the 
importance of money in elections.40 The constitution also established 
major court reforms, creating administrative courts to oversee the vast 
entrenched bureaucracy and a Constitutional Court, a majority of whose 
members are non-political. 41 Pro-participation reformers also demanded a 
provision for direct popular participation in oversight through a petition 
process that allowed 50,000 citizens to initiate both legislation and investi-
36. Phongpaichit & Baker, supra note 4, at 436-39; Prudhisan jumbala & Maneerat 
Mitptasat, Non-governmental Development Organizatins: Empowerment and Environment, 
in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 195, 214-15 (Kevin 
Hewison ed., 1997). 
37. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, §§ 282-90. 
38. Id. §§ 56, 59. 
39. Id. § 60; see also id. § 76 ("The State shall promote and encourage public partici-
pation in laying down policies, making decision on political issues, preparing economic, 
social and political development plans, and inspecting the exercise of State power at all 
levels."). 
40. See id. §§ 297-302. 
41. See id. §§ 276-80 (describing the administrative court); see id. §§ 255-70 
(describing the Constitutional court). 
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gation of corrupt practices.42 
Thailand's "People's Constitution," regrettably now repealed, repre-
sented the most extensive pro-rights, pro-participation public law reform in 
any emerging society, with the exception of South Africa.43 But the practi-
cal effect of reform continues to depend not only on officials' respect for 
citizens' individual and participatory rights, but also on Thai citizens' will-
ingness to invoke them. 
Assimilation of western institutions has affected the form of the Thai 
legal system, which has both civil and common law elements; however, the 
prevalence of code law, absence of citizen participation, and historically 
limited authority for judicial review suggest that civil law predominates. 
Specialized courts have existed for some time in the areas of tax, intellec-
tual property and international trade, labor, and juvenile and family jus-
tice.44 Three of these, the Intellectual Property and World Trade Court, 
Labor Courts, and juvenile and Family Courts empanel lay judges with 
career professionals.45 Lay judges are experts appointed for a term of 
years. In family court, at least one of the lay judges must be a woman.46 
The forms of lay judging incorporated by the Thai courts are clearly one 
result of the growing influence of western ideas about law.47 In the areas 
of intellectual property, world trade, and labor, involvement with the global 
market may have accelerated these developments. Lay participation in spe-
cialized courts in Thailand is ripe for study. 
The importance of citizen participation in governance and in the 
unfolding developments in Thailand, including lay participation in the 
legal process, remains a question. In other societies, elites have introduced 
lay participation in courts as a means of increasing the legitimacy of courts 
and other institutions of government. In Thailand, the 1997 constitutional 
reform sprang not from elites' concerns about the legitimacy of a govern-
ment that served their interests, but from widespread concerns about a 
government that, at times, served neither elite nor popular interests due to 
corruption and the absence of effective democracy. Court reform was per-
ceived as a mechanism of corruption control and rights enforcement, while 
democracy was achieved through an expanded electoral system and direct 
citizen participation in policy making. Thus, a careful reading of the 1997 
Constitution suggests that courts were to assume the role of guarantors of 
good government and popular rights, but remained the domain of elites.48 
42. Id.§ 304. 
43. See Andrew Harding, SouTH EAST AsIA, 1997-2003: Two CASE STUDIES ON POLIT-
ICS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 14 (2003), available at http://www.law.uvic.ca/seals/ 
forums/ I attachment.php ?attachmentid=6. 
44. Vichai Ariyanutaka, Sophistication of Dispute Resolution in Special Courts: A Per-
spective from Thailand, in LAW, DEVELOPMENT, AND Socio-EcoNOMIC CHANGES IN AsIA 
(Naoyiki Sakumoto et al. eds., 2003). 
45. The judiciary of Thailand, Section 3.1 The Courts of First Instance, available at 
http:/ /www.judiciary.go.th/eng/thejudiciary.htm#t3. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAILAND'S CRISIS 118-19 (2000). 
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Unsurprisingly, court reform in developing socienes is typically a top 
down enterprise, and, characteristically, the domain of experts influenced 
by western values and ideas. Where this leaves courts and the rule of law 
in popular consciousness as sources of political legitimacy remain to be 
seen. 
IV. Legal Consciousness 
The 1997 Thai Constitution mandated participation in many forms, 
but traditional Thai civic culture as described by Frank Reynolds does not 
emphasize participation so much as responsive authority. The question is: 
what forms of participation are valued and trusted by the Thai? What 
effect has the opportunity to participate directly or indirectly (through rep-
resentatives) had on perceptions of rights and the way "rights become 
active" in daily life? 
James Klein has noted that the 1997 Constitution facilitated popular 
participation in government on at least five different "levels," including (i) 
"cognizance" or consciousness of rights to participate, (ii) voting in elec-
tions, (iii) providing input into policy formulation, (iv) initiating oversight 
through appeal or litigation, and (v) direct participation by running for 
office. 49 Provisions of the Constitution enhanced every level of participa-
tion. In 2003, the Thai government drafted a law giving effect to the new 
Constitutional rights to participate that elaborated citizens' rights to par-
ticipate in administrative decision making. 50 Notwithstanding the Consti-
tution's emphasis on participation, Klein is not optimistic about the 
likelihood that the law will have any immediate effect on widespread resis-
tance to public participation by administrative agencies themselves.51 An 
important question for the longer term is what value the Thai themselves 
place on these forms of participation, a fortiori, what appeal do more spe-
cialized forms of citizens participation have such as juries and lay judges? 
Law and society scholarship has drawn attention to interpretive 
processes that accompany involvement with law, referring to the mental 
states of those influenced by law as "legal consciousness." Social scientists 
who study juries or lay judges have known for some time that wealth, edu-
cation, specific experiences, value orientations, or attitudes may be 
predictors of perceptions of injury or wrong doing and appropriate legal 
remedies. In contrast to studies of predictors of perceptions and actions of 
citizens participating in the legal process, research on legal consciousness 
embraces more than fixed attitudes or demographic indicators and consid-
ers a broad range of social action in everyday life contexts. Research on 
legal consciousness draws attention to cognition, the process by which 
49. James Klein, Public Participation and Hearings in the New Thai Political Context, in 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION IN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING (Ken-
neth Haller & Patcharee Siroros eds., 2003). 
50. See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND. 
51. See Klein, supra note 49, at 122-29. 
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individuals come to know the social world and give it meaning.5 2 One 
important conclusion reached through such research is that cognition 
influenced by law may affect an individual's self-perceptions, social rela-
tionships, and selection of interpretive frameworks for interactions in the 
everyday world, as well as one's interactions with formal legal institutions. 
legal consciousness may not only influence individuals in "taking on 
rights" (to use Merry's suggestive phrase53) as a good bet or leaving them 
alone in interactions with authorities or power holders, but may also influ-
ence expectations for daily interactions with family and social intimates.54 
Through such subtle and indirect effects on experience and perception law 
influences both deliberate choices and unselfconscious conduct that gives 
any form of authority or social order its meaning. 55 
Further, research on legal consciousness has suggested the impor-
tance of multiple discourses of interpretation that guide both perceptions 
of what is and of what ought to be. 56 Where a discourse of rights prevails 
in individuals' narratives of social relationships and conflict, we might say 
that an ideology of legality has become established. Where other dis-
courses are chosen to explain the occurrence or resolution of conflict, legal 
consciousness recedes in importance. 
V. Thai Legal Consciousness and Participatory Governance 
Proposals to introduce lay judging in Korea and japan on an experi-
mental basis are intended to strengthen the legitimacy of courts that are 
perceived as elite, authoritarian, and non-transparent. These experiments 
in lay participation appear to be responsive to broader social changes in 
the two democracies, namely deepening liberal democratic values. The 
proposals for symbolic participation in the legal system through the pres-
ence of a handful of lay judges suggests not only a demand for par-
ticipatory representative institutions of governance but also the 
importance of courts and, by inference, the transparent rule of law. Courts 
matter where the rule of law matters. Where legitimacy is grounded in 
something other than participatory representation and the rule of law, 
courts are unlikely venues for such symbolic reforms. 
Thailand's recent history of popular support for monarchy, authorita-
rian civilian or military rulers, and parliamentary democracy is puzzling 
for scholars attempting to understand the importance of law and democ-
racy. In many respects, Thailand's repeated return to authoritarian rule is 
more like the experience of its authoritarian neighbors, Singapore, Malay-
52. Frank Munger, Culture, Power, and Law: Thinking About the Anthropology of 
Rights in Thailand in an Era of Globalization, N.Y. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007). 
53. Martin, supra note 2. 
54. See id. 
55. See DAVID ENGEL &: FRANK MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN 
THE LIVES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003). 
56. Id. See chapter four for examples, narratives of persons with disabilities about 
social injustice included discourses of religion, the market, or family obligations as well 
as a variety of discourses about rights. 
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sia, and Indonesia than the more advanced democracies of Korea and 
Japan. Yet the public's assumption that many of the principles of the 1997 
Constitution will be retained, together with a history of popular move-
ments for social justice and a legal profession that is both increasing rap-
idly in size and has at times defended human rights, suggests a continuing 
opening for participatory governance. 
In this part of the article, I consider evidence bearing on the aspects of 
Thai legal consciousness most relevant to citizen participation and the rule 
of law. High quality surveys of public opinion now available in Thailand 
provide some help in identifying key elements of legal consciousness,57 
and a recent analysis of this data examines the breadth and strength of 
support for democratic institutions and acceptance of control by laws, pro-
cedures, and institutions created through democratic processes.58 Data 
from the 2001 Asian Barometer survey shows Thai citizens' strong prefer-
ence for democracy over all other forms of government. 59 For example, 
83.8 percent said that democracy is always preferable to authoritarian 
forms of government.60 Although Thai express a strong preference for 
democracy, the meaning of "democracy" cannot be taken for granted, nor 
can support for participatory representative institutions and the rule of 
law, assumptions that might be made safely in a survey conducted in the 
United States or Europe. Just a few decades ago, historian David Wyatt 
reported that some rural people thought that the Thai words for democracy 
and constitution were the names of members of the King's family. 61 
In 2001, about 70 percent of Thai surveyed co.uld name at least one 
specific characteristic of democracy and 25 percent two or more. Most 
frequently mentioned were protection of freedom and civil liberties (38% 
of the 70% or 28% of all surveyed), equality (10.5% of all surveyed), and 
individualism (7.7%).62 There was little support for "Asian values" such as 
social responsibility or communalism.63 More important for the future of 
western-style liberal democracy, there was little evidence that the Thai 
associate democracy with political and participatory elements that West-
57. The Asian Barometer describes itself as "an applied research program on public 
opinion on political values, democracy, and governance" encompassing survey data 
from twelve East Asian political systems and five South Asian countries on "citizens' 
attitudes and values toward politics, power, reform, and democracy in Asia." See gener-
ally, The Asian Barometer, available at http:/ /www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/ 
introduction/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
58. See generally, Robert Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Developing Democracy 
under a New Constitution in Thailand (2004), available at http://www.asianbarometer. 
org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.28.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (dis-
cussing the Asian Barometer data drawn from a survey conducted in 2001). 
59. Id. at 15 and Table 2. 
60. Id. at 45. 
61. Id. at 10. 
62. Id. at 11 and Table 1. 
63. Robert Albritton & Thawilwadee Bureekul, Social and Institutional Supports for 
Plural Democracy in Eight Asian Nations: A Cross-National and Within-Nation Analysis, 16 
(2005), available at http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/working 
papers/no.31.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
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ern conceptions take for granted. 64 Indeed, there was strong support for 
abolishing opposition parties.65 Overall, 76 percent said diverse views 
made society chaotic, and 45 percent said they should not have to tolerate 
views that differed sharply from their own.66 These views, combined with 
a strong belief in traditional civil liberties such as freedom of speech, yield 
a complex picture of independence and intolerance, direct majoritarian 
democracy, and rejection of the conflict and contention of party politics 
and representative democracy.67 
While parties and party politics face great skepticism in Thailand, the 
highly popular 1997 Thai Constitution provided for direct participation in 
many ways-extending electoral democracy to local government, providing 
for public participation in administrative decision-making, and direct refer-
enda by petition.68 The constitution mandated non-partisan oversight to 
protect the people's rights (including rights to participate).69 Yet inclusion 
of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to participate must be 
reconciled with seemingly contradictory tendencies. For example, Thai cit-
izens gave mass support in recent elections to the authoritarian Prime Min-
ister Thaksin Shinawatra, and later apparently approved the bloodless 
military coup that sidelined him in September 2006. 
Further qualifying Thai support for democracy is the trust in tradi-
tional, non-partisan, and undemocratic institutions. The Constitutional 
Court is the institution that enjoys the most trust-over 82 percent of 
respondents. 70 Other non-partisan governmental agencies also have 
gained trust. The military is trusted by 80 percent of the respondents, 
however, second only to the Constitutional Court.71 By contrast newspa-
pers, parties, and NGOs receive low ratings, even lower than the much-
feared police. 72 
The apparently contradictory tendencies of Thai popular support for 
different forms of government may be explained in part by a pronounced 
difference in the perceptions, and legal consciousness, of two important 
groups in contemporary Thai society. Albritton and Bureekul argue that 
there is a pervasive split between two groups of Thai citizens characterized 
by three overlapping differences: urban and rural, more educated and less 
64. For example, few respondents mentioned parties, elections, or parliamentary 
decision making. Id. at 14. 
65. Id. at 16-17. 
66. Id. at 19. 
67. The meaning of an apparently strong preference for democracy over other forms 
of government is also tempered by the fact that about fifty percent would prefer eco-
nomic development to having a democratic government. Id. at 16. 
68. Id. at 18-19. 
69. In addition to creating a non-partisan constitutional court and administrative 
courts, the 1997 constitutional created a non-partisan National Election Commission 
and a non-partisan National Counter Corruption Commission. CONSTITUTION OF THE 
KINGDOM OF THAILAND, § 136 et seq. and § 297 et seq. 
70. Albritton & Thawilwadee, supra note 58, at 27, Table 10. 
71. Id. at 28. 
72. Id. 
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educated, and "modern" values and "traditional" values. 73 Driving the dif-
ferences, they argue, is acceptance or rejection of traditional values. The 
survey measured acceptance of traditional values by the respondent's 
agreement with the importance of obedience to parents, a hiring preference 
for friends and relatives, family interest taking precedence over the individ-
ual, the loss of face by a male who works for a female boss, the belief that 
elders should resolve disputes, and the idea that husbands should per-
suade daughters-in-law to obey their mother. 74 Acceptance of traditional 
values was in turn highly correlated with low respect for minority rights, 
high trust in social and political institutions, and weak support for the rule 
of law.75 Not surprisingly, embracing traditional values was more charac-
teristic of rural Thai, while rejecting traditional values and embracing 
"modern" values was strongly associated with urban residence and more 
education.76 Albritton and Bureekul point out that apparently there is an 
ironic concluding twist to the tale of two democracies. While a moderniz-
ing bourgeoisie should in theory be the vanguard of participatory represen-
tative democratization, precisely the opposite seems to be true in Thailand. 
Urban, educated Thai now seem to mistrust democracy precisely because 
rural Thai embrace it uncritically and without expectation of controlling 
their corrupt political representatives. 77 
We might compare the values of the rural majority in Thailand as 
revealed by the survey data with de Tocqueville's description of citizen par-
ticipation, still a principal source of Americans' continuing vision of gov-
ernance. Participatory governance in America is associated with belief in 
civic (if not social) equality, tolerance of conflict, accountability to local 
communities of electors, and distrust of traditional hierarchy, large institu-
tions, and expert administrators. In almost every respect, the rural Thai 
majority's traditionalism influences them to hold an opposing view. The 
powerful urban, educated minority are more sympathetic to modernism 
and participatory representative governance when it reflects their values, 
but they are skeptical of any form of participatory governance dominated 
by the rural electorate. Further, the strong aversion of both urban and 
rural Thai to conflict and intolerance of opposing political views evidenced 
by the survey data strongly suggest a lack of trust in fellow citizens. In 
contemporary Thailand, it is hard to imagine that lay participation in the 
legal process-especially by average citizens rather than experts-would 
increase the legitimacy of courts or the rule of law. 78 
73. Id. at 22-26, 29ff. 
74. See id. at 43 (Appendix 1). 
75. Acceptance of the rule of law is defined by level agreement with seven proposi-
tions: government should decide what can be discussed; government leaders should be 
followed like heads of a family; judges should defer to the executive; political leaders 
should be able to ignore procedures; with support, a leader should ignore minority 
views; if the country is in difficulty, it is OK to disregard laws. Id. at 43 (Appendix 1). 
76. Id. at 22-26. 
77. Id. at 23. 
78. Further, the Asian Barometer data for other countries included in the survey 
suggest that the same pattern exists in many developing Asian societies, namely the 
existence of two cultures (and perhaps two ideals of democracy or rule of law) character-
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Surveys of public opinion offer one kind of evidence of the prospects 
for participatory forms of governance and the rule of law, but other forms 
of evidence help us understand how these orientations toward democracy 
and law may influence daily social life as well as interactions with legal 
and political institutions. A recent ethnographic study of the way that ordi-
nary Thai respond to injuries caused by strangers (for example, an auto 
accident) illustrates how traditional values and globalization have com-
bined in a unique way to reduce the likelihood of accountability under the 
law. 79 Contrary to expectations, globalization has led to a decline in will-
ingness among Thai interviewed in this study to invoke rights in response 
to injury. This is because changes associated with globalization uprooted 
traditional forms of dispute resolution that operated in the shadow of law 
by destroying the relationships that made them meaningful.80 Instead, 
injured individuals found resolution in an evolving form of Buddhist prac-
tice. The return to Buddhism in a new form suggests the continuing 
impact of the modern Thai civic religion on legal consciousness. 
Scholar Peter Jackson, who has studied Buddhist influence on contem-
porary Thai social movements,81 concludes that while religious diversity 
has increased in Thailand, and the state has become secularized because 
Buddhism itself is no longer controlled by the state, Thai society remains 
deeply religious, strongly suggesting that legal consciousness will continue 
to be influenced by elements of Thailand's "civic religion."82 Even if other 
institutional elements favor greater reliance on law or the court system for 
addressing injuries, Buddhism may well have its impact on the meaning of 
injury or injustice and the adequacy of remedies offered by law. 
Globalization and differences between rural and urban social organi-
zation and values have intertwined in other ways to create a two-track envi-
ronmental movement in Thailand. The engine of social change has been 
Thailand's booming economy following the end of the Vietnam War, and 
the subsequent decline of communist influence in the rural areas of North-
eastern Thailand.83 Rapid growth accelerated exploitation of timber, 
waterways, and other natural resources, with two profound political 
effects. First, the former political periphery, including the rural poor and 
ized by modern versus traditional values, urban versus rural cultures, more education 
and western acculturation versus less education and traditional acculturation. Albritton 
&: Bureekul, supra note 58. 
79. David Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts, 
and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAW&: Soc. INQUIRY 469 (2005). 
80. Id. at 469, 502. 
81. Peter Jackson, Withering Centre, Flourishing Margins: Buddhism's Changing Politi-
cal Roles, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (Kevin 
Hewison, ed., 1997). 
82. Frank Reynolds, Dhamma in Dispute: The Interaction of Religion and Law in Thai-
land, 28 LAW&: Soc'y REv. 433 (1994). 
83. Philip Hirsch, The Politics of Environment: Opposition and Legitimacy, in POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN THAILAND: DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (Kevin Hewison ed., 1997). See also 
Philip Hirsch, Environment and Environmentalism in Thailand: Material and Ideological 
Bases, in SEEING FOREST FOR TREES: ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THAILAND 
(Philip Hirsch ed., 1996). 
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ethnic minorities living within the forests, or on its margins, or whose vil-
lages were in the future floodplain of a proposed dam, has become politi-
cally active. After years of contact with activist NGO workers, they have 
been motivated to seek redress from the government, and if none is forth-
coming, to undertake direct action to save homes and livelihoods. s4 They 
have been supported by international human rights and environmental 
NGOs opposing massive development projects worldwide that are planned 
and implemented without input from the affected communities. The World 
Bank, one of the world's chief dam builders and a source of funding for the 
Pak Mun Dam in Northeast Thailand, is a particular target of NGO opposi-
tion. The Pak Mun Dam project threatened to inundate many villages and 
became the focus of the Assembly of the Poor's most widely known 
campaign.85 
The Assembly of the Poor, an important rural movement in opposition 
to destructive government-sponsored development projects, has con-
structed its claims for justice from traditional concepts of popular welfare 
and moral accountability. Rather than formal law and litigation, its leaders 
deployed demonstrations, petitions to government officials, and media 
campaigns.86 In rural Thailand, where adversarial legalism is less familiar 
or common, Thai social movements have seldom relied on litigation to 
advance their goals. Both before and after the ratification of the "People's 
Constitution," many groups of rural Thai citizens have preferred to take 
their grievances directly to government officials and the King by means of 
petitions and demonstrations at Government House, rather than by invok-
ing political and legal means afforded by law or by the Constitution. As 
recently as April 2006, the King departed from prepared remarks to 
admonish petitioners to use their constitutional means of redress. These 
remarks served as a monarchical reminder about the power afforded by 
law: use it or lose it. 87 Even the rights-advocating Lawyers Council of Thai-
land has encouraged such traditional appeals to the paternalism of govern-
ment bureaucrats by acting as a go-between for petitioners on behalf of 
traditional communities but rarely using the courts to seek redress on their 
behalf.88 
The second effect of development on environmentalism has occurred 
because Thailand's boom has expanded greatly Thailand's "middle class." 
Thailand's varied social strata do not correspond to Europe and America's 
classes of property-owners and salaried tiers. Instead, an emerging middle 
class, comprised of salaried and professional workers in government, uni-
versities, and industries, together with a rapidly growing number of entre-
preneurs, is beginning to flex its political muscle. This middle class 
84. Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 36. See also BRUCE M1ss1NGHAM, THE AssEMBLY 
OF THE POOR IN THAILAND (2003). 
85. See Missingham, supra note 84, at 38-41. 
86. See generally, id. at 38-41. 
87. See Roundup: Thai King Criticizes Current Political Mess, PEOPLE's DAILY ONLINE, 
April 26, 2006, available at http://english.peopledaily.corn.cn/200604/26/eng200604 
26_261157.html#. 
88. Id. 
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supports causes that express their values and, frequently, take critical 
views of government. On the one hand, the environmental movement has 
been characterized by rural activism, supported by transnational and Thai 
NGO's and, significantly, activist monks whose actions and words mobilize 
the Thai civic religion with great power.89 On the other hand, a more tech-
nocratic, nonconfrontational environmentalism is supported by the contri-
butions of the "salariat,"90 including entrepreneurs who have found 
environmentalism a useful accommodation, and by transnational NGOs 
advocating "sustainable" or "responsible" development.91 
Willingness to "take on" participatory rights may be influenced by 
culture-the framework of values and expectations created through shared 
experience, but also, as the study of Thai injuries showed, by changing 
patterns of opportunity and risk. The government has used force against 
peaceful resistance to its authority. For example, the administration of 
ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra faced serious charges of human 
rights abuse for his administration's treatment of protesting Muslims in 
Southern Thailand and other groups.92 His government also faced accusa-
tions of widespread corruption that undermined responsible public admin-
istration. 93 James Klein's review of the prospects for increased public 
participation after the 1997 constitution concludes by observing that there 
was an unbroken pattern of indifference by bureaucrats to the legal rights 
of the public to participate in government decision making.94 Local polit-
ics was long renowned for the use of strong-arm tactics to induce compli-
ance with the wishes of the powerful, a practice which also continued after 
the reaffirmation of local democracy and participation rights in 1997.95 
89. See generally Susan M. Darlington, The Ordination of a Tree: The Buddhist Ecology 
Movement in Thailand, 37 ETHNOLOGY 1, Winter 1998; Philip Hirsch & Larry Lohmann, 
Contemporary Politics of Environment in Thailand, 29 AsToN SURVEY 439 (1989). 
90. Pasuk and Baker use this term to describe one of the relatively educated and well 
to do groups that make up the middle class in Thai society. Pasuk Pongpaichit & Chris 
Baker, Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN THAILAND: 
DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 32-35 (Kevin Hewison ed., 1996). 
91. Jumbala & Mitprasat, supra note 36, at 196. 
92. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006 REPORT ON THAILAND, available at http:/ 
/hrw.org/english/docs/2006/0l/18/thailal225l_txt.htm; THE AsIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION REPORT, available at http://www.ahrchk.net/pr/mainfile.php/2006mr/356/. 
93. Specific charges of corruption have included deals that favored members of the 
Prime Minister's family, but corruption reached as far as the non-partisan National Elec-
tion Commission and led to the invalidation of an election. For a discussion on Thas-
kin's money policies see Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, THAKSIN: THE BUSINESS OF 
POLITICS IN THAILAND 197-224 (2004). 
94. See Klein, supra note 49. 
95. Id. Klein describes skillful disrespect for the right to participate in government 
decision making: narrow interpretation of prior law, perfunctory hearings without sig-
nificant effect, SLAPP litigation against critics of private development, resulting riots 
and demonstrations outside government offices. Where the power of government offi-
cials and private power-brokers has been seriously challenged, violent reprisals are not 
unknown. 
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Conclusion 
Studying the prospects for citizen participation in the legal systems of 
Asian societies reminds us of the unique nature of the liberal European-
American legal system, and how important its historical and cultural ante-
cedents are to the establishment of its particular forms of citizen participa-
tion and empowerment.96 The effects of political and legal institutions 
depend upon the symbolic and social resources that a society offers. Juries 
function because courts work in certain ways in Europe and the United 
States. The impact of lay judges on popular perceptions of courts is impor-
tant where courts themselves are regarded as playing an important, if com-
plex, role in protecting democratic values. The unique virtue of a liberal 
legal system is that it is perceived as supporting democracy (by guarantee-
ing the rules of democracy) while also acting independently of 
majoritarian or popular justice. An independent judiciary can protect indi-
viduals against abusive officials or an abusive public. The very indepen-
dence of liberal legal institutions often makes them appear remote and 
sometimes unpopular. Lay participation is one mechanism that arguably 
helps close the gap between judicial independence and popular legitimacy. 
The preconditions for citizen participation are not met, however, 
where the law seems irrelevant to everyday practices of redressing injustice 
perpetrated by other citizens and government officials. Legal conscious-
ness is one aspect of globalization. Legal consciousness linking the legiti-
macy of governmental institutions to citizen participation cannot develop 
unless rights and participation appear to be good bets. For some-prima-
rily those benefiting from globalization-they often are. Others who have 
not benefited from globalization may not perceive their rights and partici-
pation the same. Our brief look at Thailand shows that the effects of 
globalization are more complex than such a simple economic or social 
calculus could predict. A large majority of Thai trust traditional authorities 
and mistrust conflict resolution through partisan political institutions. For 
them, traditional authority may seem to be the only thing that works. The 
context is critical. Global development creates a motive for change, but 
existing institutions and available resources shape the direction of change. 
It is hard to imagine common people, who may perceive themselves 
marginalized by the politics of development and globalization, investing 
legitimacy in criminal juries where the military and police are trusted to 
take care of the nation but are often perceived to be lawless. It is equally 
difficult to imagine common people investing legitimacy in civil juries and 
lay judges where ordinary citizens do not think law offers a meaningful 
solution for conflict. 
96. See generally Bernadette Meyler, The Trials and Tribulations of the English jury: 
Some Lessons for Emergent Systems of Lay Participation, paper delivered at the Cornell 
Law School Conference on Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems, September 
22-23, 2006. 
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Afterword 
And what about Thailand's "September surprise?" The unexpected 
military coup placed hopes for constitutionally-grounded citizen participa-
tion in Thailand's political and legal systems in a new light as old patterns 
reappeared. Many saw the hand of the King behind the military coup and 
a general vote of "no confidence" in democracy by the traditional elite. 
This discouraging perspective, although supported by the evidence of con-
tact between coup leaders and the King prior to the coup, may overestimate 
the power of such traditional elites to veto democracy for the foreseeable 
future. An alternative, institutional perspective would emphasize instead a 
cyclic pattern caused by the rivalry among competing groups with power to 
veto each other's designs for long-term hegemony. A proposition called 
Arrow's Theorem, which emphasizes the effects of competing, non-overlap-
ping majorities, is well-known among theorists of legislative decision-
making, and might explain why neither democracy nor extreme authorita-
rianism prevails for long in Thailand.97 Although majorities oppose cor-
ruption, favor economic development, and embrace democracy, they are 
non-overlapping majorities that are often divided on other issues. Thus, 
rural and urban Thai oppose corruption but are divided on questions of 
economic development and, for now, democracy. Urban middle class and 
traditional elites, such as royals, bureaucrats, and the military, agree on 
stability but are often at odds about corruption and democracy. Rural 
Thai have been courted by the King's development projects but often seem 
to have different views of democracy and corruption, though they are 
rarely in open conflict because the King is revered and royal influence in 
politics is seldom made public. Yet, this perspective also seems to con-
demn Thailand to a stalemate that is inconsistent with the rapid economic 
and social change that Thailand has experienced over the past half 
century. 
A third interpretation is that the coup does not signal a return to cyclic 
instability at all. Although the initial deadline set for restoration of consti-
tutional democracy has passed, coup leaders have publicly acknowledged 
the importance of expectations unleashed by the 1997 Constitution. It is 
difficult to imagine that these leaders will reject principles such as individ-
ual liberties, non-partisan anti-corruption institutions, and a constitutional 
court, which are so strongly embraced by a large majority of the people. 
Placing genuine political control in the hands of elected representatives will 
be contentious, although restructuring the power of the elected Prime Min-
ister will be the most difficult task All agree on corruption control, but the 
gap is wide between the populism of the rural majority and the preferences 
of urban Thai for pliable electoral politics responsive to aspirations of the 
middle class. Nevertheless, if Thailand's constitutional restoration 
includes more effective guarantees of civil and political liberty, then electo-
ral politics, fueled by Thailand's successful economic development, is 
97. See generally KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1970) 
(establishing the principle of "Arrow's Theorem"). 
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likely to continue to grow in importance, and Thailand's political and legal 
systems will evolve along a new, as yet, unpredictable path where the social 
and political rights of the majority will become an increasingly important 
focus in the effort by the government to achieve stability and legitimacy. 

